http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html#_ftnref12
Many
works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and
futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be
available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are
correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super-powerful
computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like
their forebears. Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a
great many such simulations. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious
(as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a
certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct).
Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not
belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced
descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this
were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the
simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones. Therefore, if
we don’t think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are
not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such
simulations of their forebears. That is the basic idea. The rest of this paper
will spell it out more carefully.
